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Forms as Individuals:
Unity, Being and Cognition in
Plato's Ideal Theory
RICHARD D. MOHR
This paper, building upon the unique-world argument of the Timaeus,
interprets anew and makes coherent some central features of Plato's
theory of Forms, in particular the sense in which each Form is one,
the way in which cognitive access to Forms is a kind of acquaintance,
and the sense in which Forms "really are.'" The interpretation
advanced might be descriptively dubbed "extreme monadism."
The position stated starkly is the following. What it is about each
Form that constitutes it as the Form it is and as distinct from all
others is not analyzable into relations and attributes. This claim is
not that Forms have no relations to each other. The position is not
a patently self-defeating monadism. There are relations between
Forms and they are all necessary ones in consequence of the eternity
of each Form. Relations between Forms and the phenomena come
and go since the phenomena come and go. But relations between
Forms cannot be other than they are. Some of these necessary relations
are merely formal relations, like sameness, difference, and compati-
bility. But others are relations between the contents of Forms; one
Form would not be what it is if another were not what it is. But
relations between Forms do not constitute the core content of any
' The interpretation in general outline is intended to integrate with central tenets
of the American unity school of Platonic scholarship— in a way that spares those
tenets many recent critiques.
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Form. No Form can be exhaustively reduced to, analyzed into, or
derived from other Forms. This holds true of any Form regardless
of its degree of specificity or generality. It applies to both the Idea
of animal-in-general and the Idea of land-creature, both the Idea of
element and the Idea of fire.^
Conversely, Plato seems to hold that the relations which Forms
have among themselves are not entailed by what each Form is. This
admittedly is highly counter-intuitive. One usually thinks, for instance,
that one thing is different from another entirely by virtue of what
each is. But Plato explicitly claims just the opposite, at least for
merely formal relations. No Form is the same as or different than
another because of what it is: "Each one [of the parts of the Form
of difference, i.e., each and every Form] is different from the others
not by reason of its own nature {dia ttjv avroi) (f)V(nv) but because of
its participation in the Form of difference" {Sophist 255e4-6). What
a Form possesses of necessity, then, is sharply distinct from what it is
to be the Form it is.
More importantly and surprisingly, each Form is not distinguished
as the Form it is by virtue of possessing properties. Each is uniquely
distinguished neither by the possession of a set of properties nor by
the possession of some single, simple, unanalyzable property. Each
Form is fundamentally an individual, not a thing qualified. As the
Form it is, each is tl or tovto, not iroibv. It is only in relation to a
Form that something else has (or is) a quality, whether the something
else is a Form, soul or phenomenon.^ Such qualities, however, neither
singly nor in groups are constitutive of the core content of any Form,
though they entirely exhaust the content of any phenomenon.
'^ So correctly, H. F. Cherniss, who notes the sharp distinction for Forms between
necessity and "essence": "What Aristotle calls genus, differentia, and species are for
[Plato] all distinct ideal units, each other than the others, each having aspects which
imply the existence of the others or are compatible with them, but each being an
independent nature which cannot be exhaustively analyzed into the others" {The
Riddle of the Early Academy [Berkeley 1945], p. 54; see also more generally chapter
one of Cherniss' Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Early Academy I [Baltimore 1944]).
The unique-world argument itself has sometimes been construed as a denial of this
view. See, for example, R. E. Allen, Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms
(London 1970), p. 88, note 1. Against this denial, see R. D. Mohr, The Platonic
Cosmology (Brill 1985), pp. 29-33.
' In the case of phenomena, since they have the status of images of Ideas cast
onto the mirror of Space, it is more accurate to say simply that they are qualities (or
congeries of qualities) than that they are things which have qualities. Each is toiovtov
with no TOVTO {Timaeus 49c7-50b5).
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I. Forms as Unique
These conclusions, especially regarding qualities, are consequences
of Plato's claims in the unique-world argument {Timaeus 30c-31b)
that both the Form of animal-in-general and the world as animal-in-
general are unique and yet that the world is an instance or image of
the Form. I assume that uniqueness in the argument is an external
or metaphysical attribute of the Idea of animal, that is, that uniqueness
is a property of the Idea qua Idea, rather than qua being the particular
Idea it is."* Further, I suggest that the Idea of animal is thought to
be unique because it serves as a standard or measure. Plato twice
gives an argument that each Form is unique by virtue of its status as
a standard {Republic X. 597c, Timaeus 31a).
^
Further, as standards, Forms are the fundamental individuals of
the Platonic universe: everything else is dependent for its identification
and intelligibility upon them. But they do not stand in this relation
to anything. It is in this way, as self-sufficient, basic and independent,
that the Idea of animal is repeatedly said to be complete in every
way (Timaeus 30d2, 31bl), just as standards or measures in general
are said to be complete {Republic VI. 504c 1-3).^ The Idea of animal
is not complete in the sense of being a whole of essential constitutive
parts, a whole which is unique, if it exhaustively contains all the
instances of some type.' So Forms as standards turn out to be both
fundamental individuals and fundamentally individuals.
Imagine the following scenario. Someone introduces Romulus to
me, alleging that Romulus is an only child {novoyeurjq). Now if Remus
is standing nearby, birth certificate in hand, I would be in a good
position to say that the introducer was at least mistaken. If it further
turned out that the introducer was fully familiar with Remus, say, by
being his parent, then I also could reasonably claim that the introducer
• So, Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism, pp. 295-96 and David Keyt, "The Mad Craftsman
of the Timaeus," Philosophical Rexneui 80 (1971), 230-35. Those who take uniqueness
as a property peculiar to the Idea of animal derive their interpretation from R. D.
Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (London 1888), pp. 94-95; they include Richard Parry,
"The Unique World of the Timaeus," Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979),
1-10 and Richard Patterson, "The Unique Worlds of the Timaeus" Phoenix 35 (1981),
105-19, against which see Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 15-16.
'' See Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 24-26.
^ On this important but little discussed passage and on the completeness of Forms
generally, see Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 33-36.
' Parry and Patterson construe uniqueness in this way, that is, as exhaustive
completeness (see note 4 supra). This sort of uniqueness, however, simply is not found
in Plato's account of the way the world is unique in consequence of its animality
{Timaeus 33b-37c).
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either was crazy or was lying. If further the introducer, in self-defense,
claims that Romulus is an only child just exactly because he is an
identical twin to Remus, I would have to conclude that the introducer
is not crazy, but is intentionally being perverse, hoping perhaps for
a chuckle on my part.
Those numerous critics, who suppose that Forms have the prop-
erties of which they enable the recognition in other things, are
committed, it seems to me, to viewing Plato in the unique-world
argument as taking upon himself the same role as the introducer in
this Roman scenario. For if the Idea of animal is such that, when it
is copied, a formal similarity obtains between it and the world with
respect to animality, and if both the Idea and the world are claimed
to be unique each as being the sole possessor of animality-in-general
and if this is claimed to be so as a direct result of the similarity of
Idea and world, then Plato must be making a bad joke. For one
cannot without contradiction claim that two formally identical things
are each severally unique with respect to the very property they have
in common, and further one cannot in all seriousness draw attention
to the contradiction by claiming the two things are unique because
they are formally identical. Since the unique-world argument and its
surrounding pages are deadly serious, some way out of the Roman
paradox needs to be found.
One way out, which will not work, is to claim that the Idea and
its instance, though similar with respect to the very property of which
allegedly each is the only possessor, possess it each in a different
manner or in relation to some further distinguishing feature, such
that each is unique in possessing the common property in some way
the other does not. The Moon is unique in this way. It is unique not
qua moon, but in relation to the Earth. It is the Earth's only moon.
On this account, the Idea of animal will be the only animal-in-general
which is an Idea and the world will be the only animal-in-general
which is a phenomenal object. This way out will not work for it
marks a retreat from the explicit and emphatic claim that the world
is unique because it is like the Idea {Timaeus 31a8-b2).
The correct way out of the paradox is to recognize that Plato is
using "unique" in two subtly but importantly distinct senses. The
world is unique in the sense of being one in number and the only
instance or possessor of its kind. Thus Plato calls the world novoyevijq
{Timaeus 31b3, 92c9), which here has its root sense "only begotten"
(cf. Critias 1 1 3d2). Plato, however, crafts the unique-world argument
carefully so that this term is not used to qualify the model. He uses
rather the abstract coinage fiovcoaic, ("one-ness") to describe the
uniqueness of the model {Timaeus 31bl). In part the choice is perhaps
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governed by a desire to avoid associations of generation which attach
to novoyevrjq. In part the choice is perhaps an attempt to signal a
slight change of sense. However, because the term is a Platonic nonce-
word, its sense, which eventually comes to mean "singularity by virtue
of isolation or remoteness,"^ has to be gleaned from the argumentative
context.
When the context is scrutinized carefully, it turns out that in
ascribing uniqueness to the Ideas, Plato does not mean that each
Idea is one in number and the only instance or possessor of its kind,
but rather means that each Idea is one in number and the only one
for its kind, the kind or common characteristic of which it makes
possible the identification in its various instances. Each kind has but
one thing which makes possible the determination that the things
which possess the kind indeed do possess it. This one thing is the
Form for that kind (so Republic X. 596a6-b4).
Within the unique-world argument the subargument showing that
the Idea of animal is unique indeed establishes it as unique in the
sense of being one-/or-a-kind and not in the sense one-of-a-kind
{Timaeus 31a4-7; cf. Republic X. 597c). Important results follow from
this establishment. For the world can be unique in the sense of being
one-of-a-kind, which is the only way in which an instance of a F6rm
could be unique qua instance, and the world can be unique in this
sense without, as it were, "competition," since the Idea of animal is
no longer unique in this sense. But if the world alone is to have the
status of being unique in the sense of being one of the kind it is (i.e.,
of-Animal),^ then the Idea of animal will necessarily not be of that
kind. The Idea of animal, therefore, must be fundamentally an
individual since it is numerically one, and yet is independent of being
of a kind with respect to what it is. Though some things may be said
of it (e.g., its external or metaphysical properties and its merely
formal relations), its "essence" is not an attribute or quality.
Insofar as the uniqueness of the Idea of animal is an external or
metaphysical property of the Idea, what the unique-world argument
as a whole adds to Plato's arguments for the uniqueness of Forms is
a commitment (sometimes read even as implied in those arguments)'"
that each Form is not of the kind of which it allows the determination
in other things. Forms are fundamentally individuals.
« See LSf s.v.
^ The kind is determined by multiple occurrences of an asymmetrical relation
which individuals hold severally to a unique other individual, on analogy with the
way in which all the particular sculptures and paintings of Churchill constitute a
kind: of-Churchill.
'° For example, Cherniss, Selected Papers (Leiden 1977), pp. 332-34.
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Plato then resolves the Roman paradox by using "unique" in
subtly ambiguous ways when he ascribes it variously both to Idea and
instance. Each Idea is fundamentally an individual and is unique in
the sense of being one for a kind; whereas the world is unique as
being one of a kind, the only instance of its Form. This means,
though, that Plato is neither crazy nor disingenuous in asserting that
the world is similar to its Idea and yet that both world and Idea are
unique.
II. Some Problems and their Resolutions
If Plato indeed construes Forms fundamentally as individuals, new
problems may appear to crop up where old ones were resolved. For
the implications of this view for his logic and epistemology will have
a tendency at least initially to boggle the mind.
If it is asked, for example, in what way Forms for different kinds
differ from each other, it turns out that no ordinary vocabulary exists
in which to state the answer accurately. They are numerically distinct
to be sure. But if what has been said about Forms so far is true, it is
logically impossible to say that they are formally distinct. For they
no longer are to be thought of as having properties with respect to
what each is by means of which they might be formally distinguished.
And yet they cannot simply be bare particulars capable of being
interchanged without any subsequent effect. For they must be dis-
cernibly distinct in order to be each for its kind alone. So two features
of the unique content of Forms may seem to be severally paradoxical
and jointly contradictory: on the one hand, a Form's uniqueness
cannot be analyzed in terms of its possession of properties, properties
which might distinguish one Form from the next, and yet on the
other hand, the various contents of Forms must be fundamentally
individuals without, though, being merely fungible.
Some intuitive sense, however, can be made of these curious
conditions if it is noted that they jointly apply to pre-theoretical
understandings of the referents of mass nouns (gold, glass, water,
flesh, wood). Aristotle is on the mark when he gives these, rather
than the referents of count nouns (hors'^s, trees, golf balls) as paradigm
cases of matter— that of which predications are made. They are
metaphysically distinct as that to which properties or forms attach,
but are themselves neither simply properties nor form/matter com-
posites. For each is distinctively a stuff. The referent of a count noun
is not a stuff. A horse, a cow and a man are not three "stuffs" or
three kinds of stuff. Aristotle is therefore off the mark with his
doctrine of relative matters— the view that, for instance, gold is a
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qualification of yet another matter, water, in the same way that a
ring's shape is a qualification of its gold. On this view, "gold" would
become a count noun and gold would cease to be a stuff— would
lose its most distinctive metaphysical character. A form/matter or
attribute/thing analysis applies neatly only to the referents of count
nouns.
Indeed common understanding does not suppose that the referents
of mass nouns are things which have properties that account for their
various distinctive natures. Rather the properties which common
understanding associates most closely or "essentially" with the refer-
ents of mass nouns are properly ascribed rather to things other than
the referents themselves— things which, however, have the properties
by virtue of the referents themselves serving loosely as standards for
identifying the properties. Thus one says that water is wet, but really
what one means by wet is that a wet thing is one that has water on
it or in it in a way that can be felt. One uses water to identify things
as wet. Or one says that water is drop-forming, but really what is
meant when one calls something drop-forming is that it acts in air as
water does. Or one says that water is life-giving, when what one
really means is that for a non-artificial object, taking in water is
required to maintain it as the kind of thing it is. So similarly stand
to each other the items of the following couples: gold/golden, lead/
leaden, flesh/fleshy.
On the other hand, everyday pre-theoretical, pre-Bohr understand-
ing does not suppose that some deep, hidden, ultimately quantifiable
structure or "genotype" is metaphysically lurking in the nature of
things to guarantee and account for the unique natures of the referents
of mass nouns.
Common understanding tends to view the referents of mass nouns
as primitives. Water is a prime case. Once it is seen that the properties
most closely associated with it are not what make it what it is but are
consequences in other things of what it is, nothing is left to say about
it in the language of properties that gets to the heart of what it is.
And yet it is different than gold. The unique content of the referent
of a mass noun is neither on the one hand analyzable into properties
nor on the other merely a fungible particular. Something like this
understanding of mass nouns as indicating primitive contents, I
suggest, stands behind Plato's understanding of the unique contents
of Forms.
It also stands behind his understanding of the necessary relations
between contents of Forms. The descriptions in the late dialogues of
relations between contents of Forms are elaborated almost entirely
in terms of metaphors of artistic and natural production which apply
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chiefly and in some cases exclusively to mass nouns: blending, per-
vading, cutting, purifying, intermingling, interweaving, harmonizing.
These are metaphors of processes by which stuffs come to be related
or distinguished and help explain how Plato can both maintain the
view that the contents of Forms may necessarily entail each other
and yet that no Form's content is exhaustively analyzable into that
of other Forms.
The relations between contents of Forms may be viewed, as Plato's
metaphors suggest, on an analogy with blendings which produce
alloys. Brass would not be what it is if copper and zinc were not what
they are, and yet one has not exhausted or even much clarified the
nature of brass in saying that it is copper blended, pervaded, mixed
or infused with zinc. Zinc and copper are not said of brass, nor brass
of either of them. Neither of them is either a genus or a differentia
of brass, and yet they, in the distinctive ways of stuffs, are as "essential"
to it as anything might be. So too, I suggest, Plato views the contents
of Forms as "blending" and standing to each other in the ways that
the referents of mass nouns are distinctively interrelated. They may
stand in relations of necessary entailments to each other and yet not
constitute singly or in groups the "essence" of each other."
If Forms are unique individuals the contents of which are not
distinguished by properties, then not only will Forms not be essentially
described in Aristotelian definitions per genus and differentia but
also the names of Forms will not even be disguised definite descrip-
tions. For Forms are not what they are as the result of even partially
being solutions to sets of conditions which might be treated discur-
sively. If the names of Forms are names in any modern sense, they
" Besides the metaphors of blending, harmonizing and the like, Plato does use
another set of metaphors to describe some relations between Forms: embracing and
scattering— two metaphors which apply most aptly to the referents of count nouns
rather than mass nouns. But, he uses these metaphors not to suggest substantial
relations between Forms, that is, necessary relations of content by which one Form
would not be what it is if another were not what it is. Rather the two metaphors are
simply complementary ways of indicating merely formal relations of similarity: x
encompasses, embraces or surrounds) and z if it is a Form of which they are instances,
and V and z are scattered or dispersed if they have a formal identity between them
by virtue of each participating in some one Form x. Thus, "are scattered" is equivalent
to "participate in." Like the participation relation, the dispersion relation holds not
only between one Form and others (e.g., Sophist 260b8) but also between a Form and
its phenomenal instances {Timaeus 37a5, Philebus 15b5). Because similarity relations
hold most clearly between the referents of count nouns, not mass nouns, Plato's use
of the metaphors of encompassing and scattering to indicate such relations is well
motivated and clever, since it allows him to hold in reserve his metaphors of blending
to indicate substantial relations between Forms. On the encompassing relation, see
Mohr, Cosmology, pp. 27-29.
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are most like Russellian logically proper names, which pick out
individuals as individuals from a field of immediate acquaintance.
However, the invariably spatial determinations which provide the
distinctness needed for "this" and "that" in ordinary deictic discourse
are either completely inappropriate or hopelessly metaphoric when
applied to the "field" of Ideas. It will be the content of each Idea
showing forth itself as it is which constitutes the distinctness necessary
for their being picked out by "this" and "that." Further, though
names of Forms do not harbor descriptive elements, nevertheless,
since each Idea has a peculiar content, the names of Forms may be
used incorrectly. If one Form is called by a name, it will be incorrect
to call any other Form by that name.
It is frequently objected that if Forms are fundamentally individuals
and not primarily fulfillments of conditions or are not in some other
way subjects of significant descriptions, but are simply given individ-
uals which at best can merely be named rather than described, then
they lose their explanatory power and so too their very reason for
having been hypothesized in the first place, and so allegedly fail in
their metaphysical and epistemological mission.'^ The answer to this
charge is that the explanatory power of Forms as standards lies in
their relations to other things. Standards allow us to describe and
identify other things and insofar as standards form necessarily related
clusters, they can explain causal relations among other things. In this
regard, Plato is no more silly than Aristotle or any philosopher who
wishes to claim that some principles of explanation must themselves
be beyond explanation.
III. Acquaintance with Forms
It might be argued that, if Forms are fundamentally individuals and
not essentially things qualified, then, even with possible problems of
their causal inertness set aside, Platonic Forms will fail to be within
the category of the cognizable on pretty much any theory of cognition
which one might pick.
Since Aristotle's day, it has been hard to imagine that anything
could be, or could be perceived as being, one without it also being
one of some kind {Physics II, chapters 1-3, 7; De Anima II, chapter
12). However, some intuitive grasp can be had of what it is like to
take in something as being one without having also to consider it as
'^ For instance, this charge of explanatory vacuousness has been leveled by J. M.
E. Moravcsik, "Recollecting Plato's Theory of Forms," Phronesis supplementary volume
II (1976), pp. 18-20.
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one of some kind, a kind which is capable in theory of multiple
instantiations, if it is acknowledged that something like this is how
an individual recognizes non-reflexively other individual people as
unique. One's immediate taking in of others is as their being each
numerically one but not of some kind. Even if one is pressed into
cataloguing a list of a person's accidental characteristics and quirks
which are sufficiently diverse to apply collectively only to this person
(gait, eye-color, gender, general location, sense of humor, pretensions,
etc.), one would be chary of calling this compounded predicable a
kind, even if the catalogued characteristics were jointly capable in
theory of duplication. Humans tend to perceive even Romulus and
Remus immediately as unique without appealing to their spatial
distinctness or the order of their births. The reasons for humans first
thinking of people as individuals rather than collocations of properties
are complex, resting probably at the intersection of theology, sociology,
biology and ethics. The point is only that people in fact do take in
other people fundamentally as individuals. Perceiving or grasping
Forms will be roughly analogous to the way one takes in people as
individuals.
Platonic knowledge, as a kind of seeing or apprehending with "the
mind's eye" {Republic VI. 508d4), will be strongly disanalogous then
to Aristotelian perception or perception-like passive thought {De Anima
II, chapter 12; III, chapter 4) in which processes the cognizer becomes
formally identical with the object of cognition. A Form just as the
Form it is has no qualitative nature with which to stand in a relation
of formal identity to a perceiver. For it is a "this" {tovto) with no
essential "such" {-kol'ov).
IV. The Third Man Argument
That the Ideas are fundamentally individuals rather than things
qualified spares Plato's two-tiered ontology from entailing the vicious
logical regress of the Third Man Argument (TMA).'^ The unique-
world argument helps pinpoint where Plato supposes the TMA goes
awry when directed at his theory of Ideas. The TMA assumes that
(a) any Form along with its instances can be taken as members of a
set of which all the members severally but in common possess the
attribute which makes the instances instances of the Form. The TMA
further assumes that (b) since in accordance with good Platonic
'^ For texts see Parmenides 132al-b2 and 132dl-133a6; Aristotle's On the Forms,
in Alexander (of Aphrodisias), In Metaphysica commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck (Com-
mentaria in Aristotelem graeca, 1) (Berlin 1891), 84.21-85.11.
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principles all attributions of properties to things are made by reference
to some Form beyond the set of things which consists of members
with a common property, there must be another Form over and above
the first. Given (a) and (b), and if in addition (c) the new Form too
is formally identical to the members of the earlier set, then there
will be an infinite regress of Forms. The regress will be vicious because
by virtue of (b) prior members of the regress presuppose (for their
identification) posterior members of the sequence, of which there is
no last member. Plato would reject (a) and a fortiori reject (c). He
accepts (b). In the vocabulary of the recent critical tradition, (a) and
(c) presuppose self-predication of Forms, that is, they assume that
each Form possesses the same property it defines in other things.
And (b) presupposes the non-identity of Form and instance, that is,
it presupposes that a thing which possesses an attribute cannot be
numerically identical with the Form by which one claims the thing
has the attribute it has.
Those who suppose that Plato is committed to the TMA argument,
in order to get the requisite premise (a) for the argument, must
assume that in the unique-world argument Plato is reproducing the
Roman paradox discussed above. They must claim that the Idea of
animal and the world severally but in common possess the attribute
"animal," so that Plato is being intentionally perverse in calling each
unique because the two are so similar.
If Forms are fundamentally individuals and are not things which
possess characteristics with respect to what each peculiarly is, Plato
is clearly not committed to and indeed would deny premise (a) and
its self-predication assumption. For one will not be able to make a
mental review of a Form and its instances in such a way that it turns
out that they are discovered to form a set the members of which
each possess some formal identity with every other member.
V. The Really Real
If Forms are fundamentally individuals, a fairly precise account can
be given of the Platonic sense of "to be" and of what Plato means
when he says that each Form "really is" {Republic X. 597d2, Philebus
59d4, Phaedrus 247c7).
The sense of the Platonic "to be" has been extensively debated.
Recently, the range of possible senses of "the Form of F is" has
become saturated. Every possible sense of the Greek "to be" has
been ascribed to the Platonic "to be." The possible senses of dtvai
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1. incomplete copula: "to be" = "to be F" (by far the most popular
critical view; taken as the Platonic "to be" by G. Vlastos et al.).^'^
2a. complete first-order veridical: "to be" = "to be so " "to be as it
is said to be," "to be the case" (i.e., "is the state of affairs which
true propositions describe") (C. Kahn).'^
2b. complete second-order veridical: "to be" = "to be true" (as
applied to propositions) (G. Fine)."^
3. complete existential: "to be" = "to exist" (old guard unitarian
critics)."
If Forms are standards or more especially are fundamentally
individuals, the Platonic "to be" will have to be a complete existential
sense. The old guard unitarians are right on this matter. The Platonic
"to be" is some sense of "to exist."
If Forms are not fundamentally (if at all) things qualified with
respect to what each particularly is, then the Platonic "to be" as
applied to the Form of F cannot mean "to be F," and so a fortiori the
distinctive way in which a Form is said to be, i.e., "completely" or
"really" cannot mean "to be F par excellence^ or "to be F to the
greatest degree possible" [therefore, not 1].
If Forms are fundamentally individuals then a Form by itself,
though it is said "to be," does not constitute a state of affairs which
can be captured in propositional form. So it does not seem that the
Platonic "to be" is a first-order veridical sense ("to be the case").
Only a network or combination of Forms could be said to be in this
sense. And it is clear that the Ideas as a whole are said to be because
each individual Idea is said to be and not vice versa. In general the
view that the Greek "to be" is a first-order veridical sense fails to
'•' Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton 1973), pp. 42-57 and especially
58-75; Richard Ketchum, "Plato on Real Being," American Philosophical Quarterly
(1980), 213-20; G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic" in Essays in
Ancient Greek Philosophy II, ed. John P. Anton and Anthony Preus (Albany, NY 1983),
pp. 232-63; and Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, " 'Nothing' as 'Not-being': Some
Literary Contexts that Bear on Plato" also in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II,
pp. 59-69.
"^ Charles Kahn, "Some Philosophical Uses of 'to be' in Plato," Phronesis 26 (1981),
105-34.
'^ Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V," Archiv fUr Geschichte der
Philosophic 60 (1978), pp. 121-39.
'^ Frequently only implicitly assumed, but see for example, Cherniss, Papers, pp.
131-32 and Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues" in
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. Allen (London 1965), pp. 57-58.
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give full weight, or indeed any weight, to the role that unity plays
in defining "being" at least in Parmenides and Plato'® [so, not 2a].
When it is claimed that the Platonic "to be" is a second-order
veridical sense, which when taken together with the qualifiers "really"
and "completely," is solely applicable to the Forms, what is meant is
that all propositions which actually have a Form as their subject's
referent will invariably be true (whereas some statements about a
phenomenal object will be true, others false). But as with sense 2a,
a Form just by itself, though it is, does not establish the truth of even
a single proposition (regarding what it alone is) let alone establish
the truth of a whole field of propositions [so, not 2b].
Forms, therefore, must be said "to be" in some complete existential
sense. The Platonic "to be" is some sense of "to exist." However, if
Forms are fundamentally individuals, the sense of "exist" here cannot
be the post-Kantian sense in which "to exist" means "to be an instance
of a concept" or "to be the value of a variable."'^ If Forms are
fundamentally individuals with respect to what each one is, then they
are not even candidates for serving as things over which one may
quantify. On this modern account of existence, the instances of Forms
will exist, but Forms themselves will not. With respect to being the
Form it is, each Form possesses no properties which can be cast as
predicates in such a way that the Form's name may be said to provide
a value for their variables.
Further, however one construes those among the Great Kinds in
the Sophist which are dispersed to and said of all Forms (namely.
Being, Sameness, Difference, and Rest), it is clear that Plato supposes
Forms to exist because they participate in Being rather than because
they can be values for bound variables of the predicates "same,"
"different," and "at rest" {Sophist 252a, 254d, 256a, e, 259a). Iron-
ically, on my account Plato turns out not to be a Platonist, as
"Platonist" is used in current discussions of number theory, wherein
to be a Platonist is to be committed to quantifying over abstract
entities.
Because the Platonic "to be" applies directly to individuals as
individuals, it must mean something within the constellation of notions
"to be actual," "to be substantial," "to be there in such a way as to
provide an object to point at," and "to present itself." When the
adverbial qualifications "really," "completely," or "purely" are at-
'^ See Kahn, "Why Existence does not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek
Philosophy," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), pp. 323-34.
'^ For a denial that the modern sense of "to be" is the sense used by Greek
philosophers generally, see Kahn, ibid., pp. 323-25.
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tached to this sense of "is," the compounded designation means "is
this way (actual, self-presenting) on its own or by virtue of itselfy or "is
there to be picked out independently of its relations to anything."
These adverbial qualifications are basically equivalent to the Platonic
Kad' avTO, especially when it is contrasted with irpoq tl.
The main engine for the opposing, most widely held view that the
Platonic "to be" is a predicative sense— "to be F"— is the contention
that an existential sense would be incompatible with Plato's various
claims that different things may have different degrees of being or
admit o^ more or less being (e.g., Republic V. 479c8-dl ; VII. 515dl-3).2°
Only the predicative sense, so it is claimed, can properly capture the
notion of different things being in different degrees, since only
predicates (or at least some of them) pick out properties which can
be manifest in varying degrees. Allegedly existence cannot admit of
degrees, since "existence" is not a predicate. However, this allegation
will be true only if "to exist" is construed in the modern sense as
"to be an instance of a concept," "to be the referent of a subject of
which predications are made" or more formally "to be the value of
a bound variable." For admittedly a thing cannot partially be an
instance of a concept. This is clearly the case with concepts like cow
and seven. And even if one were tempted to claim that, say, a piece
of cloth might partially instantiate red or some concept that admits
of degrees, it would be more accurate to say simply that it is an
instance or token of the type or shade it is, say, puce. And yet, if "to
exist" is taken not in the modern sense, but as meaning "to be
substantial (independently of its relations to anything else)" or "to
be there on its own in such a way as to be pointed at" or the like,
then its sense is completely compatible with an understanding of
different things possessing different degrees of being—an under-
standing on which the various degrees need not form a continuous
scale.
The telling example of this understanding for the Platonic meta-
physics is the following. A shadow or an image in a mirror or a
dream object will be less {real), in the requisite sense, than its original.
And the original will be fully or be completely (real), again in the
requisite sense. For its substantiality is not further dependent upon
something else in the way the image is dependent upon it. And yet
there is no continuous scale of degrees between the grade of existence
of the image and that of its original. This account, then, of the
Platonic "to be," which simply appeals to intuitions that stand behind
some quite ordinary linguistic conventions concerning "being" and
^^ So Vlastos, pp. 60-63, 66, and especially Mourelatos, p. 65.
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"real," captures better than does Vlastos' the central metaphor of
original and image by which Plato chiefly conveys his metaphysics of
Forms.^'
Plato does not suppose that his talk of a thing admitting more or
less of something else entails that the something else consists of a
scale of continuous gradations. For in the Statesman Plato ranks number
(i.e., integers) along with length, breadth and thickness (or swiftness)
as examples of things that admit of more and less (284e) and yet he
is as fully aware as Aristotle that numbers do not admit of continuous
variation. Five fingers are not just sort of odd; they just are odd and
not even a slight bit even or a slight bit six (Phaedo 103e-104b,
104d-105b, 105d, 106b-c, and especially Cratylus 432a-b). For Plato,
being, like integers, may be manifest in non-continuous degrees.
Plato is a neo-Platonist to the extent that he thinks that being is
sometimes a predicate; however, he fails to be a neo-Platonist in that
he does not suppose that an examination of any two grades of being
will always reveal some third intermediary grade.
This reading of the Platonic "to be" also accounts nicely for what
Plato says about the sense in which things other than Forms are. The
phenomena or objects of opinion exist on this account, but they do
not "fully" or "really" exist {Republic V. 479c8-dl, cf. VII. 515^1-3;
Timaeus 28a2-4, 52c4-5). They are there to be pointed at, but not
by virtue of themselves. They are doubly dependent on other things.
For their ability to shine forth, they depend both upon the Forms by
virtue of which they are the images they are and upon the Receptacle
or Space, which serves as a medium for their reception (Timaeus
52a-c).
In calling the Receptacle itself a "this," Plato seems to want to
assign to it the same full reality which he assigns to the Forms (50a 1-2,
a7-b2). Plato's confessed trouble with designating clearly the mode
of cognition of the Receptacle (52b 1-2) then arises not because the
Receptacle lacks qualities or attributes (50b-c, d-e, 51a7), but rather
^' Vlastos and Mourelatos simply mistake the implications of Plato's use of the
image metaphor as a vehicle for explaining senses of "to be." They too hastily
assimilate the metaphor to the predicative sense of "to be." Neither author gives any
weight to or shows any awareness of Plato's exclusive use, as a vehicle for his ontology,
of non-substantial images, ones that is which, like shadows, images in mirrors, and
television pictures, but unlike photographs, sculptures, and paintings, require for
their existence— their "being there"— the persistence both of their originals and of
a medium in which they must appear. See Vlastos' analysis of the shadow images of
Republic VII. 515d, pp. 61-62 and Mourelatos' analysis of dream and shadow images,
p. 62. For a detailed look at the nature of non-substantial images and the implications
of their use in Plato's exposition of his ontology, see E. N. Lee, "On the Metaphysics
of the Image in Plato's Timaeus," Monist 50 (1966), pp. 341-68.
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because, though it is a "this," it indeed does not shine forth or present
itself. When one looks to it, one does not see it, one sees what is in
it (52b3-5). When one points at it, one does so indirectly.
If this characterization of the existence of Forms is correct, the
earlier account of their acquaintance is reinforced: the mode of
cognition of Forms must be a form of unmediated acquaintance,
operating on a rough analogy with the way in which without a
moment's reflection and really without doubt one spots an individual
or recognizes him as the individual he is.
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